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ABSTRACT
Formal theories of multi-agent systems require a rich ontol-
ogy for modelling the dynamics of social behaviour. In this
paper a formal analysis of the social behaviour of individual
and social agents within the BDI paradigm is provided. The
central idea behind this approach is that stability and regu-
lation of activity within a group of agents can be accounted
for by means of a complex web of roles, commitments obliga-
tions and rights. In particular, collective commitments are
considered to be the attitudes that hold a group of agents to-
gether. In pursuit of their own objectives as well as in order
to support their collective commitments, agents adopt roles
and undertake social commitments. Being semi-autonomous
they may decide to drop their commitments and roles, but
they may have to bear the consequences of the other agents’
prerogative to exercise their rights.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Arti…cial Intelligence]: Distributed Arti…cial In-
telligence—Multiagent systems ; F.4.1 [Mathematical Logic
and Formal Languages]: Mathematical Logic—Modal logic
General Terms
Theory
1. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent systems have become increasingly popular as
a means of providing solutions to inherently complex and
distributed problems that require the cooperation and co-
ordination of a number of loosely-coupled individual agents
[19, 31]. Consequently, theoretical and practical research
in multi-agent systems needs to address issues such as sta-
ble group activity and regulation of behaviour that arise in
cooperative problem solving and teamwork. From the theo-
retical perspective these issues need to be investigated in the
context of formal theories of agents. Most theoretical models
view agents as intentional systems that are characterised by
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a mental state. The most prominent such framework is the
BDI paradigm [3, 25, 26, 35] which models agents as having
beliefs, desires and intentions. Reasoning about cooperative
activity and teamwork in the context of such theories re-
quires a very rich ontology of social and collective attitudes
such as mutual beliefs and intentions, commitments as well
as normative concepts such as obligations and rights.
Most traditional work in this area has concentrated on the
concept of commitment [19, 29]. As noted by Castelfranchi
[4], commitments are very important since they link an in-
dividual agent’s activity with the group’s objectives. Works
addressing collective attitudes such as joint intentions that
lead to teamwork and cooperative problem solving include
[8, 33, 34]. Joint intentions and social plans have been con-
sidered in [27] in an extension of the original BDI paradigm
to the multi-agent case. Another extension of the BDI model
considers social and collective commitments [12] in which a
collective commitment is the strongest notion of teamwork.
Recently, normative concepts have also been explored in the
context of collective activity. Krogh [20] argued in favour
of obligations in multi-agent systems, traditionally the sub-
ject of deontic logic [1, 17], in order to formalise norma-
tive aspects of the agents’ behaviour. Works that consider
issues regarding obligations and commitments include [11,
10]. Other approaches to obligations and other normative
concepts such as rights and duties include [16, 22, 32].
These studies are informative and they have o¤ered im-
portant insights into cooperative problem solving and team-
work. However, the analysis of commitment provided, which
is considered to be the cornerstone of collective activity, is in-
su¢cient and unsatisfactory. In addition, there seems to be
confusion between the concepts of social and collective com-
mitment; the terms are used interchangeably to describe two
di¤erent things while some researchers use one term when
they actually mean the other [4]. These theoretical mod-
els tackle the problem from di¤erent perspectives and they
o¤er complementary, but not comprehensive views of col-
lective activity; none of them covers the full spectrum of
social and collective attitudes that are typically involved in
teamwork. For instance, works that deal with commitments
very often ignore the relevance of normative concepts such
as obligations, while other works that examine joint inten-
tions or goals do not explicitly consider commitments or
obligations. In addition, very few studies have attempted to
develop models of collective activity using organisational ap-
proaches. Concepts such as roles are used in a very informal
way and practically there has been little e¤ort to incorporate
organisational terms and concepts into multi-agent systems
with the exception of works such as [28, 6, 5] and [24, 9].
In this paper a formal analysis of the dynamics of social
behaviour of individual and social agents within the BDI
paradigm is presented. The paper is organised as follows.
Next the basic ideas behind this approach are discussed. The
following section describes the basics of the multi-modal log-
ical framework that is based on the classical BDI paradigm.
An analysis of the primary individual and group attitudes
follows. Next a formal analysis of the basic ingredients of
the theory starting from obligations, rights and preferences
and moving subsequently to commitments and roles is pre-
sented. Finally the paper ends with a summary and pointers
to future work.
2. SOCIAL DYNAMICS
The central idea behind the approach adopted here is that
stability and regulation of activity within a group of agents
(team or organisation) can be accounted for by means of a
complex web of roles, commitments, obligations and rights.
There are two types of agents in a multi-agent environment:
individual and social. An individual agent is simply an
agent, whereas a social agent consists of other individual or
social agents; hence a team and an organisation are both so-
cial agents. In the discussion that follows the terms “group”
and “social agent” are used interchangeably.
Stability and fairness in a multi-agent environment is cru-
cial and as a consequence some form of general rules and
norms should restrict the behaviour of individual agents.
These general obligations express normative sentences and
can be seen as rules that provide the minimal means of social
interaction. They express what ought to be the case for all
agents and they are impersonal, that is no explicit reference
is being made to a particular agent.
While in pursuit of its own objectives an individual agent
may decide to join groups and thus engage in teamwork
and cooperative problem solving. As has been extensively
argued in the literature, commitments play a very important
role in such activities [4, 34]. In particular, the position
that collective commitments are the attitudes that hold a
group of agents together is endorsed here. These are the
internal commitments of a group and they can be viewed as
expressing the purpose and objectives of the whole group.
Collective commitments depend on other group attitudes
such as mutual beliefs and intentions.
In order to achieve their individual objectives as well as
to support their collective commitments, agents adopt roles
and undertake social commitments. When an agent joins a
social agent, it assumes or is given a speci…c role. This role
entails a set of commitments, obligations and rights, and
speci…es the position of the individual in the social agent as
well as its commitments towards the group and the rest of
the individual and social agents. Each member of the social
agent knows its place and acts accordingly and furthermore
each knows the implications of exercising rights and break-
ing commitments. Individual and social agents may adopt
roles in relation to other individual or social agents. How-
ever, when an agent adopts a role, it does not necessarily
mean that it has to adhere to it forever. Circumstances
may arise when an agent may decide to abandon a role, al-
though this may not be without consequences. Moreover,
agents may hold di¤erent roles in di¤erent groups and as a
result con‡icts of interest may arise. Futhermore, roles may
also be associated with authority relations thus giving rise
to a notion of power.
In addition to social commitments resulting from the adop-
tion of roles, agents take up social commitments of their own
accord as a result of promises towards other agents. Often
there is confusion in the use of the terms ”social” and ”col-
lective” commitment, and they are regarded as meaning one
and the same thing or they are used interchangeably. How-
ever, we consider the notion of a collective commitment to
be very di¤erent from that of a social one, albeit related.
A social commitment characterises the relation of an agent
(bearer) towards another (counterparty) with respect to an
action or state of a¤airs. Often a third agent is involved,
the witness or authority in whose presence the commitment
is taken and who may have responsibility for punishing the
bearer agent in case of failing to ful…l its commitment [4].
Social commitments may arise between individual (or social)
agents and other individual or social agents.
Social commitments involve the creation of relativised obli-
gations and rights between the bearer and counterparty agents.
Relativised obligations and social commitments are di¤erent
in the following sense: if an agent commits to another agent
to bring about a certain state, then this involves not only
a relativised obligation on behalf of the bearer towards the
counterparty, but also an intention (personal commitment)
of the bearer. On the other hand, a relativised obligation
may not necessarily mean that the bearer is personally com-
mitted to bring about the state of a¤airs. In contrast to
general obligations that apply to all agents, relativised obli-
gations involve speci…c individual and counterparty agents
and can arise between a combination of individual and social
agents. Moreover, obligations go hand-in-hand with other
normative concepts such as permissions and rights. When a
bearer agent violates its obligations it inevitably frustrates
the expectations of the counterparty agent who now has the
right to impose sanctions.
A multi-agent system can be viewed as a collection of
agents who can join their forces under the umbrella of a so-
cial agent as long as they ful…l the commitments that they
undertake as part of the group and through their roles. The
system can be described in terms of its structure; that is by
the way social agents, roles and authority relations are ar-
ranged to form a whole. Agents are free to join social agents
while in pursuit of their own objectives, but at the same time
they have to balance the commitments that they undertake
while their behaviour is regulated via the relativised and
general obligations that they hold.
In the sections that follow some aspects of the dynamics of
social behaviour are formalised. In particular, obligations,
rights, commitments and roles are formalised, while author-
ity relations will be addressed as part of future work.
3. FORMAL FRAMEWORK
The logical framework is based on the BDI paradigm which
we extend into a many-sorted …rst order modal logic. The
basic ideas and the extensions made to the original frame-
work are brie‡y described here; the reader is referred to [25,
26] for the full details of the BDI paradigm.
The logical language L includes, apart from the usual
connectives and quanti…ers, three modal operators B, D,
and I for expressing beliefs, desires and intentions respec-
tively. There are three sorts: Agents , SAgents, and Other.
Agents is the set of individual agents while SAgents is the
set of social agents, which may be groups of agents or indi-
vidual agents. In fact, each individual agent is considered
to be a social agent and is included as such in SAgents.
Other indicates all the other objects/individuals in the uni-
verse of discourse. The framework includes a branching
temporal component based on CTL¤ logic [13], in which
the belief-, intention-, and desire-accessible worlds are them-
selves branching time structures. The operator inevitable is
said to be true of a path formula ° at a particular point in a
time-tree if ° is true of all paths emanating from that point.
O-formulas are w¤s that contain no positive occurrences of
inevitable outside the scope of the modal operators B, D
and I. The temporal operators optional,° (next), 3 (even-
tually), 2 (always), U (until) are also included. Furthermore
the operators: succeeds(e), fails(e), does(e), succeeded(e),
failed(e) and done(e), express the present and past success
or failure of an event e. The additional operator 2 expresses
membership in a social agent.
Semantics is given in terms of possible worlds relativised
to time points. A model for L is a tuple M =< W;E; T;Á
; S; U;B;D; I; ¼ > where W is a set of worlds, E is a set
of primitive event types, T is a set of time points, Á is a
binary relation on time points, S is the set of all situations
S µ W £ T , i.e. a situation is a world at a particular time
point, U is the universe of discourse which is a tuple itself
U =< UAgents; USAgents; UOther >, B is the belief accessi-
bility relation, B : UAgents ! }(W £ T £W ), and D and I
similarly for desires and intentions and …nally ¼ interprets
the atomic formulas of the language. Satisfaction of formu-
las is given in terms of a model M a mapping v of variables
into elements of U , a world w and a time point t (i.e. a
situation wt):
Mv;wt j= P (¿1; ::::¿k) i¤ < v(¿1); ::::; v(¿k) >2 ¼(P k; wt)
Mv;wt j= :Á i¤ Mv;wt 6j= Á
Mv;wt j= Á ^ Ã i¤ Mv;wt j= Á and Mv;wt j= Ã
Mv;wt j= 8xÁ i¤ 8d 2 U , Mv[d=x];wt j= Á
Mv;wt j= B(i; Á) i¤ 8 w0t such that Bi(wt; w0t); Mv;w0t j= Á
Mv;wt j= (¿1 = ¿2) i¤ k ¿1 k=k ¿2 k
Mv;wt j= (i 2 g) i¤ k i k2k g k
Mv;wt j= optional(Á) i¤ 9 a fullpath wt0 ; wt1 ; :: such that
Mv;wt0 ;wt1 ;:: j= Á
Mv;wt j= succeeded(e) i¤ 9 t0 such that Sw(t0; t1) = e
Similarly for the other connectives and operators.
4. INDIVIDUALMENTAL ATTITUDES
An agent’s information about the state of the world and
the other agents is represented in terms of beliefs. This
re‡ects the fact that what an agent believes may not nec-
essarily hold and thus its picture of the world may not be
correct. For the belief operator the standard KD45n sys-
tem is adopted by requiring the accessibility relation B to
be serial, transitive and euclidean:
B-K. B(i; Á) ^ B(i; Á) Ã)) B(i; Ã)
B-D. B(i; Á)) :B(i;:Á)
B-S4. B(i; Á)) B(i; B(i; Á))
B-S5. :B(i; Á)) B(i;:B(i; Á))
B-N. if ` Á then ` B(i; Á)
Desires express an agent’s motivation. They are the states
of a¤airs that the agent would ideally like to bring about. As
such they may not be consistent with each other. However,
are among the driving forces in the decision making process
of an agent. Desires can be either present or future-directed.
The axiom system adopted for desires is the Kn:
D-K. D(i; Á) ^D(i; Á) Ã)) D(i; Ã)
D-N. if ` Á then ` D(i; Á)
There are no restrictions imposed on the accessibility re-
lation for desire D. In particular seriality is not imposed
since desires may not be consistent with each other.
Intentions express an agent’s commitment to itself to bring
about a particular state of a¤airs. An agent may decide to
adopt one of its desires as intention, but not all desires may
be upgraded to the status of intentions. Intentions need to
be consistent with each other and they may be present or
future-directed. The axiom system adopted is Dn:
I-K. I(i; Á) ^ I(i; Á) Ã)) I(i; Ã)
I-D. I(i; Á)) :I(i;:Á)
I-N. if ` Á then ` I(i; Á)
The I-D axiom expresses the consistency of intentions.
The K axiom and the necessitation rule which are included
in the axiomatisation of all three attitudes are inherent of
the possible worlds approach and they hold in normal modal
logics regardless of any restrictions imposed on the accessi-
bility relation. Thus agents are logically omniscient with
respect to their attitudes. For a detailed discussion on the
logical omniscience problem see [14] .
The interrelations between the three attitudes are de-
scribed by a variation of the notion of strong realism which
comes closer to the desiderata for rational reasoning agents
[3, 26] than the original notion (for alternative notions of
realism see [15]):
I(i; °)) B(i; °)
D(i; °)) :B(i;:°)
These correspond to the following semantic conditions:
C1. 8i 2 UAgents, 8wt; w0t if Bi(wt; w0t) then 9w00t s.t.
Ii(wt; w00t ) and w00t v w0t
C2. 8i 2 UAgents, 8wt;9w0tBi(wt; w0t) s.t. 9w00t Di(wt; w00t )
and w00t v w0t
C1 requires that for all belief-accessible worlds w0t from
wt, there is an intention-accessible world w00t from wt which
is also a sub-world of w0t, while C2 that there is at least
one belief-accessible worlds w0t from wt, such that there is a
desire-accessible world w00t from wt which is also a sub-world
of w0t. A world w
0
t is a sub-world of wt (w
0
t v wt) if the tree
structure of w0t is a subtree of wt, and w
0
t has the same truth
assignment and accessibility relations as wt. By imposing
the sub-world restriction between worlds the application of
these axioms is restricted to O-formulas ° [25, 26].
Apart from the realism constraints directly relating the
three attitudes the following properties are also adopted:
Belief of Intentions
If an agent intends Á then it believes that it intends it
I(i; Á)) B(i; I(i; Á))
BI. 8wt; w0t; w00t Bi(wt; w0t) ^ Ii(w0t; w00t )) Ii(wt; w00t )
Belief of Desires
If an agent desires Á then it believes that it desires it
D(i; Á)) B(i;D(i; Á))
BD. 8wt; w0t; w00t Bi(wt; w0t) ^Di(w0t; w00t )) Di(wt; w00t )
The BDI system with the aforementioned connection ax-
ioms will be called SV-BDI. Strategies for the maintenance
of intentions as in [25] can be adopted here as well.
5. BASIC GROUP ATTITUDES
Social agents are usually aggregations of agents and they
may consist of individual agents, or individual agents and
other social agents. The fact that an individual agent i is a
member of a social agent si is expressed simply as (i 2 si).
In order to be able to reason about the members of a social
agent the following set-theoretic relations are introduced:
(sj µ si) ´def 8i(i 2 sj)) (i 2 si)
(sj ½ si) ´def (sj µ si) ^ :(sj = si)
singleton(si; i) ´def 8j(j 2 si)) (j = i)
singleton(si) ´def 9i singleton(si; i)
In order to be able to reason about a social agent’s infor-
mation state two additional modal operators EB(si; Á) and
MB(si; Á) are introduced for “Every member of social agent
si believes Á” and “Á is a mutual belief among the members
of social agent si” respectively. Following [14]:
EB(si; Á) ´def 8i(i 2 si)) B(i; Á)
Intuitively every member of a social agent believes Á if and
only if every individual agent i in this social agent believes Á.
Then a proposition Á is mutually believed by a social agent
if every member believes it, and every member believes that
every member believes it,... and so on. However, in…nite for-
mulas cannot be expressed in the language. Let EB1(si; Á)
be an abbreviation for EB(si; Á) and EBk(si; Á) for k ¸ 1
be an abbreviation for EB(si; EBk¡1(si; Á)). Thus, if EBk
expresses the k-th level of nesting of belief of the agents in
social agent si, then the social agent has mutual belief of Á:
Mv;wt j=MB(si; Á) i¤ Mv;wt j= EBk(si; Á); k = 1; 2; ::
Now de…ne w0t to be belief-si-reachable from wt if there is a
path in the Kripke model from wt to w0t along accessibility
arrows Bi that are associated with members i 2 si [14].
Then the following property holds:
Mv;wt j= MB(si; Á) i¤ Mv;w0t j= Á for all w0t that are
belief-si-reachable from wt
Using this property and the notion of reachability the fol-
lowing axiom and rule can be soundly added to the KD45n
system of belief:
MB(si; Á), EB(si; Á ^MB(si; Á))
From Á) EB(si; Ã ^ Á) infer Á)MB(si; Ã)
Next two modal operators for expressing what every mem-
ber of a social agent intends, and what is mutually intended
by a social agent EI(si; Á) and MI(si; Á) respectively are
introduced. Similarly to EB, every member of si intends Á,
if and only if every individual agent intends Á:
EI(si; Á) ´def 8i(i 2 si)) I(i; Á)
Based on the de…nition of what everyone intends, Á is
mutually intended by a social agent if every member intends
it, and every member intends that every member intends
it,... and so on. If EIk expresses the k-th level of nesting of
intentions of the agents in the social agent si, then:
Mv;wt j=MI(si; Á) i¤ Mv;wt j= EIk(si; Á); k = 1; 2; ::
A world w0t is de…ned to be intention-si-reachable from
wt similarly to being belief-si-accessible and the following
property holds:
Mv;wt j= MI(si; Á) i¤ Mv;w0t j= Á for all w0t that are
intention-si-reachable from wt
Finally, the following axiom and rule can be soundly added
to the Dn system of intentions:
MI(si; Á), EI(si; Á ^MI(si; Á))
From Á) EI(si; Ã ^ Á) infer Á)MI(si; Ã)
If the social agent is a singleton (individual agent) then
the MB and MI operators reduce to their individual con-
stituents respectively. In other words, the mutual belief of
a single agent is simply its belief, and its mutual intention
is simply an intention.
6. OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS
General obligations are expressed via an obligation op-
erator O that pre…xes propositions Á; Ã; ::: as in standard
deontic logic (SDL). A formula O(Á) is read “It ought to be
the case that Á”. Relativised obligations are expressed via
an operator O(si; sj; Á) read as “Social agent si is obligated
to sj to bring about Á”. The model for the language is ex-
tended as follows: M =< W;E; T;Á; U;B;D;I; ¼;O;O¤ >
where O is the accessibility relation for general obligations
and O¤ = fOsi;sj j8si; sj 2 USAgents ^ si 6= sjg is the acces-
sibility relation for relativised obligations between pairs of
social agents. O is considered to yield the deontically ideal
worlds relative to a world w at time point t:
Mv;wt j= O(Á) i¤ 8 w0t s.t. O(wt; w0t), Mv;w0t j= Á
Mv;wt j= O(si; sj; Á) i¤ 8w0t s.t.Osi;sj(wt; w0t),Mv;w0t j= Á
For the general obligations operator we adopt the D sys-
tem. This ensures that deontic con‡icts are not allowed,
that is not both Á and :Á ought to be the case:
O(Á)) :O(:Á)
The principle of veracity O(Á)) Á is rejected since what
ought to be the case may not be the case after all. For the
relativised obligations operator the Kn system is adopted.
As a consequence deontic con‡icts are allowed for relativised
obligations. Finally, a permission operator is de…ned as the
dual of the general obligation operator as follows:
P (Á) ´def :O(:Á)
It seems reasonable to suggest that if Á is a general obli-
gation then each agent believes that this is the case (special
constant s0 denotes the set of all agents, i.e. the social agent
that constitutes the society of the domain):
8i(i 2 s0)) (O(Á)) B(i; O(Á))) (*)
In other words, if Á ought to be the case, then each agent
i believes that it ought to be the case. This axiom requires
the following semantic condition:
8i 2 UAgents, 8wt; w0t; w00t if Bi(wt; w0t) and O(w0t; w00t ) then
O(wt; w00t )
Since general obligations ought to be believed by all agents
we also derive the following from (*) by the axiom de…ning
EB and the induction rule for MB:
O(Á))MB(s0; O(Á))
This means that normative statements are mutually be-
lieved (ideally) by all agents. It also seems reasonable to
suggest that if such an ought-to relation between an agent
(counterparty) and another agent (bearer) is in place, both
of them should be believe that this is the case:
O(si; sj; Á)) 8i(i 2 si)) B(i; O(si; sj; Á))
O(si; sj; Á)) 8j(j 2 sj)) B(j; O(si; sj; Á))
Moreover we can accept the stronger axiom that such a
relativised obligation is a mutual belief between the bearer
and counterparty agents:
O(si; sj; Á))MB(fsi; sjg; O(si; sj; Á))
Another plausible principle is that if i is obligated to j to
bring about Á, at least j should not desire that :Á:
O(i; j; °)) :D(j;:°)
This in turn requires the following semantic restriction:
8i; j 2 UAgents, 8wt;9w0tDj(wt; w0t) s.t. 9w00t Oij(wt; w00t )
and w00t v w0t
The application of the axiom is restricted to O-formulas
and accordingly it states that if agent i is obligated to j to
bring about optional(Ã), then j does not desire :optional(Ã).
Although there seem to be counter-arguments (parents may
have relativised obligations regarding their children’s educa-
tion, which the children may not desire), we assume that the
counterparty agent will take the necessary steps to free the
bearer from the obligation (although this is not present in
the current formalism), if it doesn’t desire Á to be brought
about. The following are also theorems:
O(Á)) :D(i;:O(Á))
O(Á)) :I(i;:O(Á))
Counterparty Agent
O(i; j; Á)) :I(j;:O(i; j; Á))
O(i; j; Á)) :D(j;:O(i; j; Á))
Bearer Agent
O(i; j; Á)) :I(i;:O(i; j; Á))
O(i; j; Á)) :D(i;:O(i; j; Á))
Once a social agent si has managed to bring about the
desired state of a¤airs for agent sj, or it has come to its
attention that the state of a¤airs is not an option any more,
it needs to take some further action in order to ensure that
the counterparty agent is aware of the situation. The so-
cial agent successfully de-commits itself from a relativised
obligation in the following way:
succeeded(decommit(si; sj; inevitable3Á)))
(:O(si; sj; inevitable3Á)
^ done(communicate(si; sj;MB(si; Á))))
_ (:O(si; sj; inevitable3Á)
^ done(communicate(si; sj;:MB(si; optional3Á)))
^ done(communicate(si; sj;:O(si; sj; inevitable3Á))))
Accordingly a social agent si can successfully de-commit
itself from a previously adopted relativised obligation to-
wards another agent sj if: i) the social agent has come to
believe that it has achieved its Á and in this case it drops
its obligation towards sj and lets it know that the state of
a¤airs has been achieved, or ii) the social agent has come
to believe that the state of a¤airs that is committed to is
not an option anymore, and in this case it successfully de-
commits itself by dropping the obligation and by letting the
other agent know that the state of a¤airs is not an option
and …nally that it no longer holds the relativised obligation
to bring about that state of a¤airs. communicate is used in
a generic way to indicate that the agent needs to commu-
nicate with the other agent involved in order to de-commit
successfully. This may be done by a member of the social
agent, perhaps the individual agent that has the role of the
representative or spokesperson in si. On the other hand the
counterparty agent may reserve the right to impose sanc-
tions on the bearer agent since it has the “right” to do so.
To this end another relativised operator Right is intro-
duced in order to describe that a social agent sj has the right
Ã over another social agent si expressed as Right(sj; si; Ã).
No particular restrictions are imposed on the accessibility
relation for this modality. The formula Ã may express the
form of the sanction that sj has the right to impose on si.
Obligations and rights as we will see in the subsequent sec-
tions are created pairwise. If an agent si drops a previously
adopted relativised obligation towards sj, and sj has a right
over si, then sj may decide to exercise this right. Agents
may have a lenient or a strict policy of exercising their rights.
An agent has a lenient policy if it keeps its options open as
to whether or not it will exercise its right over another agent:
Right(sj; si; Ã) ^MB(sj;:O(si; sj; inevitable3Á)) ^
:MB(sj; Á)) optional(MI(sj; optional3Ã))
That is the agent may optionally adopt the intention to
optionally eventually bring about Ã. On the other hand a
strict policy means that an agent will always exercise its
rights on the deviating agent:
Right(sj; si; Ã) ^MB(sj;:O(si; sj; inevitable3Á)) ^
:MB(sj; Á)) inevitable(MI(sj; inevitable3Ã))U MB(sj; Ã)
The agent will keep trying to bring about Ã until it actu-
ally comes to believe that it has managed to do so. Agents
may or may not reveal their policy on exercising rights to
the other agents.
7. PREFERENCES
Agents express preferences when they are presented with
a dilemma; when they are in a situation in which not every
state of a¤airs that they would like to bring about is feasible.
For instance, when somebody asks you what you would like
to drink co¤ee or tea, this means that you can drink either
co¤ee or tea, not both (of course being an autonomous agent
you may decide to have both, but then there is no reason to
express a preference). In this sense, preferences express an
agent’s choice between two states of the world that cannot
both be realisable at the same time. This is how preferences
should be understood in the context of this paper.
In order to be able to express that an agent prefers Á to Ã
the language is extended by adding a modal operator Pref .
Thus a formula of the form Pref(i; Á; Ã) means that agent i
prefers Á to Ã. Semantics to this modality is given in terms
of a world preference based on von Wright’s [36] conjunction
expansion principle. According to this, to say that an agent
i prefers co¤ee to tea is to say that it prefers situations in
which it has co¤ee and no tea to those in which it has tea
but no co¤ee. In terms of possible worlds, that is to say that
agent i prefers Á ^ :Ã-worlds to Ã ^ :Á-worlds. Unfortu-
nately the semantics of preferences which is based on normal
Kripke semantics gives rise to paradoxes of disjunction and
conjunction: if Á is preferred to Ã, then Á_Â is preferred to
Ã, and Á is preferred to Ã ^ Â. Â being an irrelevant state
of the world these properties can result in counterintuitive
situations. In order to avoid this, the ceteris paribus nature
of preferences needs to be captured: only Á^:Ã-worlds and
:Á ^ Ã-worlds that otherwise di¤er as little as possible to
the real world should be compared [2].
Following Bell and Huang [2, 18] and in line with the
Stalnaker-Lewis’ [30, 21] analysis of conditionals a selection
function cwt is de…ned as cwt(wt; jjÁjjMv ) where jjÁjjMv is an
abbreviation for Mv;wt j= Á. cwt gives the set of closest
situations to wt (worlds at time point t) in which Á is true.
The function cwt if of type S £ P (S) ! P (S). Then Â
is a comparison relation for preferences for each agent Â:
UAgents ! P (S)£P (S). The truth condition for preferences
is as follows:
Mv;wt j= Pref(i; Á; Ã) i¤
cwt(wt;jjÁ ^ :ÃjjMv ) Âi cwt(wt;jj:Á ^ ÃjjMv )
Accordingly we have the following properties [2]:
(IR) :Pref(i; Á; Á)
(TR) Pref(i; Á; Ã) ^ Pref(i; Ã; Â)) Pref(i; Á; Â)
(DL) Pref(i; Á; Â) ^ Pref(i; Ã; Â)) Pref(i; Á _ Ã; Â)
(DR) Pref(i; Á; Ã) ^ Pref(i; Á; Â)) Pref(i; Á; Ã _ Â)
(CEP) Pref(i; Á; Ã), Pref(i; (Á ^ :Ã); (Ã ^ :Á))
(AS) Pref(i; Á; Ã)) :Pref(i; Ã; Á)
(CP) Pref(i; Á; Ã)) Pref(i;:Ã;:Á)
IR and TR state the irre‡exivity and transitivity of pref-
erences respectively. DL and DR describe the left and right
disjunction of preferences while CEP states the conjunction
expansion principle. Preferences are asymmetric (AS) and
contraposable (CP). Moreover, since Pref(i; Á; Ã) implies
neither Pref(i; Á_Ã;Ã) nor Pref(i; Á; Ã^Â), the paradoxes
involving conjunction and disjunction do not arise [2].
As was mentioned earlier, agents express preferences when
they are forced to chose between two (or more) states of
a¤airs that cannot be realisable at the same time. It seems
that when an agent prefers Á to Ã, it believes that Á is an
option or can be realised, but it does not believe that Ã can
be realised or is an option at the same time:
Pref(i; Á; Ã)) B(i; optional3Á) ^ :B(i; optional3Ã)
Individual agents can express their preferences between
states of a¤airs, but it also seems possible that groups of
agents or a social agent can express a preference. To this
end a modal operator EPref(si; Á; Ã) is introduced which
is read as “everyone in social agent si prefers Á to Ã”. Thus:
EPref(si; Á; Ã) ´def 8i(i 2 si)) Pref(i; Á; Ã)
Then a mutual preference among the members of a social
agent si is de…ned as follows:
MPref(si; Á; Ã) ´def
EPref(si; Á; Ã) ^MB(si; EPref(si; Á; Ã))
This is a weaker collective attitude compared to mutual
belief and mutual intentions.
8. COMMITMENTS
Social commitments will be expressed via an operator
SCom(si; sj; Á) which is read “social agent si is committed
to social agent sj to bring about Á”. Since social commit-
ments can arise between both individual and social agents
we require a de…nition that covers all four cases. Moreover,
adopting a commitment is a rights and obligations produc-
ing act [4] between the bearer and counterparty agents and
this needs to be re‡ected in the de…nition:
SCom(si; sj; Á),
O(si; sj; Á) ^MI(si; Á) ^Right(sj; si; Ã)
^MB(fsi; sjg; (O(si; sj; Á) ^MI(si; Á) ^Right(sj; si; Ã)))
In the simple case of two individual agents the MB and
MI operators are reduced to an individual belief and inten-
tion respectively while if si and sj are groups then a mutual
intention and a mutual belief arise. Intuitively there should
be conditions under which an agent is allowed to drop its
social commitments as discussed in [19, 12]. In what follows
two di¤erent commitment strategies for social commitments
are described, namely blind and reliable.
A social agent has a blind social commitment strategy if
it maintains its commitment until actually it is a mutual
belief among the members of the social agent that it has
been achieved. The social agent will keep trying to bring
about the state of a¤airs, until there is a mutual belief that
this has been achieved:
SCom(si; sj; inevitable3Á))
inevitable(SCom(si; sj; inevitable3Á) U MB(si; Á))
Clearly such a strategy towards social commitments is
very strong. If this requirement is relaxed then we can de…ne
a reliable strategy. A social agent follows a reliable strategy
if it keeps its commitment towards another agent as long as
the members of the social agent have mutual belief that it
is still an option:
SCom(si; sj; inevitable3Á))
inevitable(SCom(si; sj; inevitable3Á) U
(MB(si; Á) _ :MB(si; optional3Á)))
We turn now our attention to collective commitments. A
collective commitment is the internal commitment of a social
agent to itself. Such a commitment seems to involve …rst of
all social commitments on behalf of the individual members
of the group towards the group, a mutual intention of the
group to achieve Á, and …nally a mutual belief that the social
agent has the mutual intention Á. Thus, the de…nition of
collective commitment is as follows:
CCom(si; Á),
8i(i 2 si)) SCom(i; si; Á)^MI(si; Á)^MB(si;MI(si; Á))
9. ROLES
Following Cavedon and Sonenberg [6] roles are …rst class
entities in this framework. Three additional sorts Relns,
RelTypes and Roles are introduced. Relns constants rep-
resent relationship instances. E.g. if Ray is in a supervisor-
student relationship with two di¤erent students then these
relationships will be represented by di¤erent Relns constant
symbols. RelTypes constants represent a collection or type
of relationship. E.g. all student-supervisor relationships will
be of the same type. RelTypes objects allow us to abstract
and associate properties with a collection of such relation-
ships. Roles constants represent “role types”, e.g. the same
constant symbols are used to represent the supervisor and
the student roles in each supervisor-student relationship.
Roles are related to relationship types via a predicate
RoleOf(a;R) which describes that a is one of the roles in
relationship of type R. A three place predicate In(si; a; r)
which asserts that social agent si is in role a of relationship
r is introduced. Moreover only one agent can …ll a role in a
given relationship at any given time:
8i; j; a; r In(si; a; r) ^ In(sj; a; r)) (si = sj)
We require that roles of a relationship type are …lled when
any role of that type is …lled (note: given a relationship r,br denotes its corresponding type):
8r;8si; a In(si; a; r))
8b(RoleOf(b; br)) 9sj In(sj; b; r))
In order to express that a role a involves the adoption of
a social commitment Á a new modality RoleSCom(a; Á) is
introduced. No particular restrictions are imposed on the
accessibility relation for this modality. RoleSCom is used
in order to de…ne the general social commitments associated
with a particular role. This then provides a way of associ-
ating relativised-obligations to roles. Intuitively if role a
involves the social commitment Á and social agent si has
the role a in relationship r, then there exists another social
agent sj (di¤erent to si) that has the role b in relationship
r towards whom agent si has the social commitment Á:
RoleSCom(a; Á) ^ In(si; a; r))
9sj; b In(sj; b; r) ^ SCom(si; sj; Á) ^ :(si = sj)
An agent can decide to drop a role if it comes to believe
that it has ful…lled its social commitments (e.g. a the super-
visor of a Ph.D. student may drop its role once the student
has been successfully examined), or if it has come to believe
that it cannot ful…l the commitments of its role anymore.
This may happen for a variety of reasons, for instance the
agent may decide that it is not to its bene…t to adhere to
the role any longer, or another role is in con‡ict with the
…rst one. However, the agent that decides to drop a role
needs to communicate to the other agent that it is doing so
as well as whether or not it believes that it has ful…lled its
commitments or not.
succeeded(droprole(si; sj; a)))
(:In(si; a; r) ^ :SCom(si; sj; Á) ^
done(communicate(si; sj; (:In(si; a; r) ^
:SCom(si; sj; inevitable3Á)))))
_(:In(si; a; r) ^ :SCom(si; sj; Á) ^
done(communicate(si; sj; (:In(si; a; r) ^MB(si; Á)))))
_(:In(si; a; r) ^ :SCom(si; sj; Á) ^
done(communicate(si; sj; (:In(si; a; r) ^
:MB(si; optional3Á)))))
An agent may also decide to drop a commitment which is
part of its role without dropping the role itself and perhaps
accepting that a form of sanction will have to be imposed.
10. SIMPLE EXAMPLE
Consider the following scenario. John (J) is a Ph.D. stu-
dent supervised by Sandy (S). John is also a member of the
University football team the Aces (A) for which he plays on
Sunday mornings. This situation regarding John’s roles and
relationships is described below:
In(J; student; r1); In(S; supervisor; r1)
RoleScom(student; followadvice) ^ In(J; student; r1))
In(S; supervisor; r1) ^ SCom(J; S; followadvice)
In(J; player; r2); In(A; team; r2)
RoleScom(player; playgame) ^ In(J; player; r2))
In(A; team; r2) ^ SCom(J;A; playgame)
On Friday morning Sandy asks John to …nish writing a
paper which needs to be sent to a very prestigious confer-
ence on Monday morning. If he doesn’t, then this will have
consequences on his progress. John realises that this needs
to be done over the weekend. His commitments are:
SCom(J; S;writepaper), O(J; S;writepaper) ^
I(J;writepaper) ^ Right(S; J; inhibitprogress(S; J)) ^
MB(fJ; Sg; O(J; S;writepaper) ^
I(J;writepaper) ^ Right(S; J; inhibitprogress(S; J)))
SCom(J;A; playgame), O(J;A; playgame) ^
I(J; playgame) ^Right(A; J; exclude(A; J)) ^
MB(fJ;Ag; O(J;A; playgame) ^
I(J; playgame) ^Right(A; J; exclude(A; J)))
Given the fact that John plays for the Aces every Sunday
it is clear to him that not both of his commitments can be
honoured. Thinking of the consequences of dropping each
of its commitments and the possible repercussions, John’s
preferences are as follows:
Pref(J; writepaper; playgame)
Pref(J; exclude(A; J); inhibitprogress(S; J))
Although he does not want to disappoint his team, he de-
cides that it is impossible to play in the game while …nishing
the paper at the same time:
B(J; optional3writepaper) ^ :B(J; optional3playgame)
Since John follows a reliable strategy regarding his com-
mitments the belief that it is not an option any longer to
play in the game leads him to drop its commitment. He
decommits and also lets the team know about this:
succeeded(decommit(J;A; inevitable3playgame)))
(:O(si; sj; inevitable3playgame)
^done(communicate(si; sj;:MB(si; optional3playgame)))
^done(communicate(si; sj;:O(si; sj; inevitable3playgame))))
Now luckily for John the team has a lenient policy and
this time he does not get excluded. Notice, that although
John did not ful…l his commitment towards the team which
was part of his role in the team, he did not drop this role.
Let the football team Aces (A) consist of the team of play-
ers and a coach for simplicity. The collective commitment
that characterises the team is that they win the X cup. This
is a collective commitment of the whole football team. Ac-
cording to the de…nition then we have:
CCom(A;wincup),
8i(i 2 A) SCom(i; A;wincup) ^
MI(A;wincup) ^MB(A;MI(A;wincup))
Accordingly, the football team has a collective intention
to win the cup i¤ every member of the social agent has a
social commitment towards the social agent to win the cup,
and it is a mutual intention among the members to do so,
and it is also a mutual belief among the football team that
the team has the mutual intention to win the cup. The
social commitments involved in this de…nition give rise to
relativised obligations and personal intentions towards the
state of a¤airs which is to win the cup. The structure of
the social agent “football_team” is described by the rela-
tionship between a team of players and a coach with the
corresponding roles. Each of the roles prescribes a set of
social commitments which come in support of the collective
commitment of the football team.
11. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presented an analysis of some of the aspects
of the dynamics of social behaviour among agents within
the BDI paradigm. The cornerstones of the approach fol-
lowed here are commitments, roles, obligations and rights.
Although, the formalism presented so far is by no means
a complete characterisation of these dynamics, it adds to
the literature in an essential way. Firstly, normative atti-
tudes such as obligations and rights are considered in re-
lation to social attitudes such as commitments and roles.
Secondly, the de…nition of a social commitment provided is
a generic one, that is, it covers all four cases of social com-
mitments arising between a combination of social and indi-
vidual agents. Thirdly, roles are associated with social com-
mitments which in turn give rise to rights and obligations
and as a result this approach provides a way of explain-
ing how these attitudes arise in a uni…ed way. Moreover,
the formalism provides the means for de-commiting from an
obligation, a social commitment or even a role in a variety
of situations. So for instance, an agent may drop a social
commitment which is part of an adopted role, without drop-
ping the role itself. However, an agent may have to bear the
consequences of the other agents’ rights on itself.
Although this work leaves many unanswered questions,
we believe it is a …rst step towards a comprehensive for-
mal model of activity and regulation of behaviour within a
group of agents. Towards this direction there are a number
of possible avenues for future research. A formalisation of
authority relations within roles is pending. Authority re-
lations seem to create power relations within a group and
issues such as whether authority relations can be transitive
need to be looked into. Moreover, we need to provide a
formal de…nition of a social agent based on roles and their
interaction. As a …rst step, we can de…ne a social agent
structure to be a generic description of the roles and the re-
lationships between them in a particular type of social agent.
Formally, a social agent structure is a tuple SA =< R;RI >
where R is a …nite set of roles R µ Roles, i.e. R is the set
of all possible roles that can be played by agents within a
social agent of this type and RI is the relationship inter-
action graph that speci…es all the valid generic relationship
types between roles, RI : R£R! RelTypes. Each edge of
the graph represents a relationship type (a; b) between roles
a; b 2 R. For the special case that a social agent is a sin-
gleton, the set of roles is the empty set and the interaction
graph has no edges. This concept of a social structure needs
to be further extended so as to take into account authority
relations as well as collective commiments.
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